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51% attack

What is a 51% attack and how to detect it?

Despite the inordinate amount of resources needed to engineer them, small-cap cryptocurrencies are still susceptible to a 51% attacks.

Despite being underpinned by blockchain technology that promises security, immutability, and complete transparency, many cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin SV (BSV), Litecoin (LTC) and Ethereum Classic (ETC) have been subject to 51% attacks several times in the past. While there are many mechanisms by which malicious entities can and have exploited blockchains, a 51% attack, or a majority attack as it is also called, occurs when a group of miners or an entity controls more than 50% of the blockchain’s hashing power and then assumes control over it. 

Arguably the most expensive and tedious method to compromise a blockchain, 51% of attacks have been largely successful with smaller networks that require lower hashing power to overcome the majority of nodes.

Understanding a 51% attack 

Before delving into the technique involved in a 51% attack, it is important to understand how blockchains record transactions, validate them and the different controls embedded in their architecture to prevent any alteration. Employing cryptographic techniques to connect subsequent blocks, which themselves are records of transactions that have taken place on the network, a blockchain adopts one of two types of consensus mechanisms to validate every transaction through its network of nodes and record them permanently.

While nodes in a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain need to solve complex mathematical puzzles in order to verify transactions and add them to the blockchain, a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain requires nodes to stake a certain amount of the native token to earn validator status. Either way, a 51% attack can be orchestrated by controlling the network’s mining hash rate or by commanding more than 50% of the staked tokens in the blockchain.

PoW vs PoS

To understand how a 51% attack works, imagine if more than 50% of all the nodes that perform these validating functions conspire together to introduce a different version of the blockchain or execute a denial-of-service (DOS) attack. The latter is a type of 51% attack in which the remaining nodes are prevented from performing their functions while the attacking nodes go about adding new transactions to the blockchain or erasing old ones. In either case, the attackers could potentially reverse transactions and even double-spend the native crypto token, which is akin to creating counterfeit currency.

Diagrammatic representation of a 51% attack

Needless to say, such a 51% attack can compromise the entire network and indirectly cause great losses for investors who hold the native token. Even though creating an altered version of the original blockchain requires a phenomenally large amount of computing power or staked cryptocurrency in the case of large blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum, it isn’t as far-fetched for smaller blockchains. 

Even a DOS attack is capable of paralyzing the blockchain’s functioning and can negatively impact the underlying cryptocurrency’s price. However, it is improbable that older transactions beyond a certain cut-off can be reversed and thus puts only the most recent or future transactions made on the network at risk.

Is a 51% attack on Bitcoin possible?

For a PoW blockchain, the probability of a 51% attack decreases as the hashing power or the computational power utilized per second for mining increases. In the case of the Bitcoin (BTC) network, perpetrators would need to control more than half of the Bitcoin hash rate that currently stands at ~290 exahashes/s hashing power, requiring them to gain access to at least a 1.3 million of the most powerful application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) miners like Bitmain’s Antminer S19 Pro that retails for around $3,700 each. 

This would entail that attackers need to purchase mining equipment totaling around $10 billion just to stand a chance to execute a 51% attack on the Bitcoin network. Then there are other aspects like electricity costs and the fact that they would not be entitled to any of the mining rewards applicable for honest nodes. 

However, for smaller blockchains like Bitcoin SV, the scenario is quite different, as the network’s hash rate stands at around 590PH/s, making the Bitcoin network almost 500 times more powerful than Bitcoin SV.

 In the case of a PoS blockchain like Ethereum, though, malicious entities would need to have more than half of the total Ether (ETH) tokens that are locked up in staking contracts on the network. This would require billions of dollars only in terms of purchasing the requisite computing power to even have some semblance of launching a successful 51% attack. 

Moreover, in the scenario that the attack fails, all of the staked tokens could be confiscated or locked, dealing a hefty financial blow to the entities involved in the purported attack.

How to detect and prevent a 51% attack on a blockchain?

The first check for any blockchain would be to ensure that no single entity, group of miners or even a mining pool controls more than 50% of the network’s mining hashrate or the total number of staked tokens. 

This requires blockchains to keep a constant check on the entities involved in the mining or staking process and take remedial action in case of a breach. Unfortunately, the Bitcoin Gold (BTG) blockchain couldn’t anticipate or prevent this from happening in May 2018, with a similar attack repeating in January 2020 that lead to nearly $70,000 worth of BTG being double-spent by an unknown actor. 

In all these instances, the 51% attack was made possible by a single network attacker gaining control over more than 50% of the hashing power and then proceeding to conduct deep reorganizations of the original blockchain that reversed completed transactions.

The repeated attacks on Bitcoin Gold do point out the importance of relying on ASIC miners instead of cheaper GPU-based mining. Since Bitcoin Gold uses the Zhash algorithm that makes mining possible even on consumer graphics cards, attackers can afford to launch a 51% attack on its network without needing to invest heavily in the more expensive ASIC miners. 

This 51% attack example does highlight the superior security controls offered by ASIC miners as they need a higher quantum of investment to procure them and are built specifically for a particular blockchain, making them useless for mining or attacking other blockchains.

However, in the event that miners of cryptocurrencies like BTC shift to smaller altcoins, even a small number of them could potentially control more than 50% of the altcoin’s smaller network hashrate. 

Moreover, with service providers such as NiceHash allowing people to rent hashing power for speculative crypto mining, the costs of launching a 51% attack can be drastically reduced. This has drawn attention to the need for real-time monitoring of chain reorganizations on blockchains to highlight an ongoing 51% attack. 

MIT Media Lab’s Digital Currency Initiative (DCI) is one such initiative that has built a system to actively monitor a number of PoW blockchains and their cryptocurrencies, reporting any suspicious transactions that may have double-spent the native token during a 51% attack.

Cryptocurrencies such as Hanacoin (HANA), Vertcoin (VTC), Verge (XVG), Expanse (EXP), and Litecoin are just a few examples of blockchain platforms that faced a 51% attack as reported by the DCI initiative. 

Of them, the Litecoin attack in July 2019 is a classic example of a 51% attack on a proof-of-stake blockchain, even though the attackers did not mine any new blocks and double-spent LTC tokens that were worth less than $5,000 at the time of the attack. 

This does highlight the lower risks of 51% attacks on PoS blockchains, deeming them less attractive to network attackers, and is one of the many reasons for an increasing number of networks switching over to the PoS consensus mechanism.

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Monero community concerned as leading mining pool nears 51% of ecosystem’s total hash rate

The sharp increase in MineXMR's mining hash rate in the past few months has led some XMR enthusiasts to suspect ulterior motives.

On Tuesday, privacy coin Monero (XMR) mining pool MineXMR's hash rate surpassed over 1.4 GH/s, accounting for 44% of the hash rate of the XMR network. MineXMR has about 13,000 miners and charges a 1% pool fee. According to a screenshot from Archive.org last August, the pool only contributed to 34% of the hash rate of the XMR network.

The rapid rise in the network's hash rate has spooked some XMR enthusiasts, with Reddit user u/vscmm writing:

"We need to talk with MineXMR to take some action right now! Please send an email for support@minexmr.com to MineXMR admins to take action; a 51% pool is not in the best interest of the community or the pool."

If a 51% attack were to occur, the bad actors involved could potentially overturn network transactions to double-spend participants' crypto. However, given that Monero obfuscates the identity of the sender and recipient through stealth addresses and ring signatures, hackers' capabilities, in this case, would be far more limited. Theoretically, they could only use such attacks to mine empty blocks or double-spend their own XMR by selling it to an exchange and then publishing an alternative ledger.

Reddit users pointed out that MineXMR publicly discloses the location of its corporate offices, which are located in the United Kingdom. Conducting 51% related denial of service and fraud attacks would likely carry criminal consequences in said country. Even if a mining pool were to accumulate over 51% of a network's hash rate, this would only compromise a blockchain's operations if the entity had ulterior motives for doing so.

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Bitcoin SV rocked by three 51% attacks in as many months

Bitcoin SV has been under the hammer of rogue actors in a series of attempted 51% attacks against the network. Where next for BSV?

Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision, the fork of another Bitcoin (BTC) fork, has for the third time in three months suffered a blockchain reorganization (reorg) attack. With a call to all stakeholders to mark the malicious network branch as invalid, Bitcoin SV (BSV) developers say the attacks have been repelled and all fraudulent chains identified.

The flurry of attacks against Bitcoin SV, though reportedly repelled, highlight the risks associated with proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains that have a low amount of hash rates backing their existence. Indeed, apart from Bitcoin SV, several chains, like Ethereum Classic (ETC) and Firo — formerly known as Zcoin — have been victims of such attempted blockchain reorg exploits.

While not all of such attacks are successful, some proceed with significant economic consequences for honest participants and the network, in general, as the rogue actors responsible for the malicious exploit on the network can double-spend “coins.” The problem has reached the extent that it is theoretically possible to launch these attacks with a few thousand dollars worth of rented hashing power.

Another blockchain reorg attack

Earlier in August, Bitcoin SV suffered a suspected 51% attack that was similar to previous incidents that occurred between the end of June and the first week of July. At the time, it was said that the malicious network exploit resulted in three versions of the main chain being mined simultaneously amid a deep blockchain reorg attack.

This type of attack occurs when a malicious actor controls 51% of the network’s hash rate and can use that hashing power majority to control and prevent block production as well as double-spend coins. The Aug. 3 incident is reportedly the largest-scale exploit against BSV since it forked from Bitcoin Cash (BCH) back in 2018.

At one point during the exploit, the attacker reportedly compromised about 10 hours’ worth of transactions on the Bitcoin SV chain, according to Nikita Zhavoronkov, lead developer at blockchain explorer Blockchair. Reacting to the event, the Bitcoin Association — a Bitcoin SV advocacy organization — advised honest node operators to mark the false chains initiated by the hacker as invalid.

Marking split chains initiated by 51% attackers as invalid is necessary to prevent the hackers from accruing any economic benefit, such as double-spending. Usually, the goal of such incidents is to send mined coins from the fake chain to the exchanges, thereby extracting monetary value from “thin air.”

In its incident update report, the Bitcoin Association stated that the hacker’s attempted 51% attacks were unsuccessful, while urging network participants to ensure that their nodes are only interacting with the chain supported by honest miners. As part of its report, the Bitcoin Association stated that all relevant stakeholders, including the Bitcoin SV Infrastructure Team, will continue to monitor the network to prevent any further attacks.

In a conversation with Cointelegraph, Steve Shadders, chief technology officer of Bitcoin SV developer nChain, stated that both stakeholders are implementing “a range of proactive and reactive measures” to prevent further attacks.

“Together with the Bitcoin Association team, we also worked with exchanges, miners and ecosystem businesses to quickly invalidate the fraudulent chain containing the illegal double-spends by using the invalidateblock command — an RPC code introduced to Bitcoin in 2014 and still part of the codebase for both BTC and BCH.”

According to Shadders, this move invalidated the attacker’s efforts, allowing honest participants to direct their hashing power to the correct chain. Shadders also stated that the attack had galvanized more hashing power to the Bitcoin SV chain to “defend the network.” Indeed, data from BitInfoCharts shows an increase in Bitcoin SV hash rate between Aug. 3 and Aug. 4, with the network’s hashing power growing by almost 15%.

Three attacks in as many months

The fact that there have been three attacks in three months, each using similar methods, has brought up talk of whether there is an agenda against Bitcoin SV. Between June 24 and July 9, Bitcoin SV suffered four separate attempted 51% attacks that resulted in double-spent coins being sent to Bitmart crypto exchange.

In July, Cointelegraph reported that Bitmark was seeking a restraining order from a New York judge to prevent the hackers responsible for the 51% attacks on Bitcoin SV from selling their double-spent coins. As of this writing, it is not apparent whether the August attacker was able to send double-spent BSV to any exchange.

In a note sent to Cointelegraph, the Bitcoin Association clarified that the existence of double-spend transactions in the June and July attacks did not have any detrimental effect on Bitcoin SV users, adding:

“It is possible that the malicious actor has been double-spending their own transactions. No losses have been incurred and nobody has had anything stolen.”

The June 24 and July 1 attacks reportedly went unnoticed, with investigations starting only after the July 6 incident. At the time, some exchanges, including Huobi, paused deposit and withdrawal services for BSV, thereby setting off inaccurate speculations that trading platforms were moving to delist the coin.

Commenting on the likelihood of the August attacks being connected with the earlier incidents, Shadders told Cointelegraph: “At this stage, while we do not have definitive proof that the same malicious actor is responsible for both these latest attacks and the earlier attempts in June and July, the similarity in attack vector and methodology would indicate that it is likely to again be the same attacker.”

The only difference between the two sets of attacks is that the June and July exploits used the pseudonym “Zulupool” — not connected to the legitimate Hathor Network miner of the same name — while the August hacker impersonated the Taal mining pool. Indeed, the June and July attacker is believed to have impersonated Zulupool and has also been linked to the block reorg exploit against Bitcoin ABC back in March.

Given the suspected links between all the attacks, Shadders told Cointelegraph that legal steps were being taken, stating:

“Bitcoin Association and its legal representatives are actively engaged with law enforcement in affected jurisdictions — a process which the Bitcoin SV Infrastructure Team is supporting on an ongoing basis by collecting and collating all of the forensic evidence that the attacker has left behind.”

Vulnerable PoW networks

PoW networks with significantly lower hash rates are vulnerable to 51% attacks since the required hashing power required to commandeer the network only costs a few thousand dollars. In some cases, a few hundred dollars worth of rented hashing power from NiceHash is enough to stage a blockchain reorg exploit on some PoW chains.

According to data from Crypto51 — a platform that tracks the theoretical cost of a 51% attack on PoW chains — it costs about $5,200 to rent the hashing power needed for a 51% attack on Bitcoin SV for one hour.

Ethereum Classic, another PoW network, also suffered multiple 51% attacks in 2019 and 2020. In one incident, an attacker reportedly siphoned over $5 million from the network while only spending $192,000 on hashing power to carry out the attack. However, it is important to note that while such attacks remain a possibility, network actors can take steps to mitigate the vulnerability.

Related: If you have a Bitcoin miner, turn it on

Indeed, in the absence of the superior network effect and massive hashing power of Bitcoin, other PoW chains need to create secondary security protocols to detect malicious blockchain reorgs. To put the hash rate disparity in stark contrast, the total Bitcoin network hashing power is currently more than 320 times greater than that of Bitcoin SV.

Crypto exchanges also need to increase the network confirmation requirement for coins whose chains do not hold sufficient hashing power. Most 51% attackers strive to double-spend their transactions via exchanges, trading their fake coins for the legitimate funds held by trading platforms often on behalf of their users.

Thus, even if the blockchain does eventually fight off the attack, the hacker can siphon value from the exploit by trading their fake coins on exchanges that fail to adopt the necessary minimum confirmation protocols.

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